Bobbie
Bobbie is an independent contractor who’s entering into a contract for services with a company. She’ll be producing a range of deliverables for the company that comprise code, documentation, and perhaps some imagery. The company is pro-AI and encourages or asks Bobbie to speed up her work by using appropriate AI tools.
Bobbie is enthused by the company’s pro-AI stance but starts to worry when reviewing the independent contractor agreement the company is asking her to sign. She’s particularly worried about the intellectual property provisions. Those provisions are along these lines:
x.1 Subject to clause x.2, all Intellectual Property Rights in Deliverables (Company IP) shall vest in the Company upon creation. To the extent that these rights do not so vest, the Contractor assigns the Intellectual Property Rights to the Company and will do all things necessary to transfer them to the Company.
x.2 This agreement does not affect the Intellectual Property Rights that the Contractor already owned as at the Commencement Date (Contractor IP). The Contractor grants to the Company a non-exclusive, non-transferable, worldwide, perpetual and irrevocable licence (which shall survive expiry or termination of this agreement for any reason), without additional cost to the Company, to use, exploit (whether commercially or otherwise) and otherwise exercise all rights comprised in any Contractor IP included in the Deliverables.
x.3 The Contractor warrants that:
(a) the performance of its obligations under this agreement;
(b) its provision of any Deliverable; and
(c) the Company’s use or distribution of any Deliverable,
will not breach any third party’s Intellectual Property Rights. This warranty does not apply in relation to any open source software that the Contractor uses or provides in performing the Services unless the Contractor knew, at the time of its use or provision, that it breached or would breach a third party’s Intellectual Property Rights.
x.4 The Contractor indemnifies the Company in respect of any costs, expenses, claims, demands or losses (including reasonable legal costs) incurred by the Company as a result of a breach of the warranty in clause x.3.
In pre-AI times, an IP clause along these lines reflected a familiar allocation of risk, with an express accommodation for open source software. It may not have been to the contractor’s liking (as the contractor might prefer to own whatever it creates), but it was understandable.
The times they are a-changin’
Fast-forward to 2026, where independent contractors like Bobbie are using AI to speed up their work, sometimes with the knowledge or at the request of the company to which they’re contracting their services. In this AI era, the use of AI tools coupled with traditional IP clauses like the one above could create significant risk for the contractor, as well as risks for the other party.
Let’s explore why that’s the case:
- Looking at clause x.1, the Company may assume that copyright will subsist in all new deliverables and that it will own all IP in the deliverables other than IP already owned by the Contractor (which the Contractor licenses to the Company to fill the gap). However, despite the computer-generated work provisions in the Copyright Act 1994,* there’s a risk that copyright may not subsist in a deliverable that is generated or substantially generated by AI (let’s call it an AI Deliverable), either at all or to the extent expected, or that the first owner of the copyright may be someone other than who the Company expects. As a result, the Company may be receiving less value and exclusivity than expected, which might create problems for it downstream.
- If Bobbie delivers an AI Deliverable to the Company that contains third party IP (for example, because the AI tool copied a third party work it found online and included it in the deliverable or reproduced material another person had created that found its way into the tool’s training data), Bobbie’s apparent assignment of IP rights to the Company under clause x.1 may be ineffective or only partly effective.
- In addition, to the extent that the assignment of IP rights is not effective, Bobbie may be unable to do anything to transfer them, which may result in the Company asserting she has breached clause x.1.
- Clause x.3 is potentially even more concerning for Bobbie. It’s a clear warranty that performing the Services, providing the Deliverables, and the Company’s use or distribution of them will not breach any third party’s Intellectual Property Rights. Bobbie may be able to stand behind that warranty for deliverables she creates herself. But can she sensibly give the same warranty about code, images, or other material generated by an AI model whose training data and internal processes she cannot inspect? The contract recognises this kind of problem for open source software and limits Bobbie’s warranty accordingly. But it makes no equivalent accommodation for the use of AI outputs that the Company itself may have encouraged.
- Clause x.4 then turns that uncertainty into a potentially substantial financial exposure, because Bobbie indemnifies the Company for loss resulting from breach of the warranty (the extent of that exposure may depend on any applicable liability cap and the rest of the agreement).
What should Bobbie and the Company do?
This may depend on the parties’ bargaining positions. The Company may want an unqualified warranty and indemnity. That may be understandable when the Company does not prevent Bobbie from using AI tools but also does not encourage or require such use.
But what about the situation where the Company encourages or requires Bobbie to use AI to speed up her work with a view to reducing the Company’s costs? In that situation, it may be unreasonable to expect Bobbie to bear the risk of an unqualified warranty and indemnity.
In this scenario, it may be preferable to take a more nuanced approach to the IP provisions.
For example, the agreement might identify AI-generated material incorporated into the Deliverables and distinguish it from Bobbie’s own work (noting that Bobbie would need to retain evidence to rely on any contractual distinction, such as prompt logs, a version history, and/or a disclosure schedule per deliverable). The treatment could depend on the nature and extent of that material and Bobbie’s subsequent contribution. Bobbie could still assign all new IP rights in the deliverables that she owns, including any rights she actually obtains to AI-generated outputs under the AI tool’s terms, while seeking appropriate qualifications to clause x.1 and the non-infringement warranty for identified AI-generated material.
The IP warranty could be qualified for that material where its inclusion has been approved by the Company, either generally in advance or on a deliverable-by-deliverable basis. Bobbie could still be responsible for taking reasonable precautions, such as only using approved tools, complying with their terms, reviewing outputs appropriately and not knowingly incorporating infringing material, but without promising something about the nature of an AI output that she has no practical means of establishing. Depending on the drafting approach, it may also be necessary to reflect any qualification in the indemnity as well so that the two provisions work well together.
For some deliverables, the answer may simply be not to use generative AI at all. If the Company is commissioning a logo, source code, or some other asset because it specifically requires exclusive and enforceable proprietary rights in it, extensive AI generation may be inconsistent with that requirement.
Finally, the parties may want to check whether the selected AI service offers an output infringement indemnity, who benefits from it (usually the AI tool customer, which here would likely turn on whose subscription Bobbie is using, i.e., her own or the Company’s) and what exclusions apply. Insurance may play a role too. Professional indemnity and other kinds of insurance policies may provide some protection against third-party infringement claims arising from AI-assisted work. But neither AI tool provider indemnities nor insurance should be assumed to solve the whole problem. In particular, protection against an infringement claim may not address the more fundamental commercial problem that an AI-generated deliverable turns out not to be the exclusive proprietary asset that the Company thought it was buying.
Takeaway
The key takeaway is that contractual IP provisions written for a pre-generative-AI world may need adjustment for AI-assisted work.
If a contractor like Bobbie is being encouraged to use AI, both Bobbie and the other party may want to make sure the contract acknowledges that fact and allocates the resulting IP risks deliberately rather than leaving them hidden inside traditional ownership, warranty, and indemnity clauses.
If you’re a business that needs to review and amend your standard terms of business to accommodate AI tool usage, feel free to get in touch.
Footnote
* On the topic of works that are generated or contributed to by AI, it helps to distinguish between using AI to assist with a primarily human-authored work, and asking AI to generate a work, such as an image produced from a single basic prompt and used without further editing. In the first situation, copyright may protect the human-authored work, provided it satisfies the usual originality requirements. In the second, it may be harder to identify human authorship or establish the necessary originality. The boundary is uncertain, and much will likely depend on the nature and extent of the human contribution.
New Zealand law adds another possibility. The Copyright Act 1994 expressly recognises “computer-generated” literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works created in circumstances where there is no human author. It treats the person who undertakes the arrangements necessary for creation of such a work as its author. That provision could potentially apply to AI-generated outputs. But we have no New Zealand court decision that addresses its application to generative AI, including who undertakes the necessary arrangements and whether the resulting output satisfies the Act’s originality requirements.

